ABSTRACT
INTROdUCTION
Election results are vanishing in many African countries. Though the exact moment of the disappearance varies from case to case, the trick occurs some time between the casting of ballots and the reporting of winners. Individual voters know who they rewarded with their ballot and the ultimate victors and vanquished are written into the historical record. How the former flows into the latter is largely a mystery because results at polling station level and other intermediary sub-national units are hidden from public view and often expunged from electoral records altogether. Though the losing parties sometimes mourn the loss of this data in the local press, for the most part the missing information goes unnoticed, both domestically and internationally. Volume 8 No 2
A great deal of pomp accompanies a typical election. Visit a polling station in the early morning hours to witness the official opening of the ballot boxes, revealing to polling station workers, party representatives, and domestic and international election monitors their contents -usually consisting of makeshift privacy screens, full colour ballot papers, voters' rolls, ink pads, and necessary office supplies. Show up at odd times throughout the day to see a queue of voters waiting their turn to present state-sanctioned identity cards to the station attendant to have them crosschecked with the official electoral commission roll.
As voters make their way through the polling station they receive a ballot with a stamp on the back to mark it as official, have their designated fingers marked with indelible ink to discourage the casting of multiple ballots, register their vote behind a privacy screen, and finally deposit the ballot paper in the proper hermetically sealed receptacle.
At dusk, or later if a judge has extended the voting period, polling stations are turned into counting centres. The ballots are removed from their boxes for all interested parties to see, placed in piles according to the marked candidate, counted, and tallied in the official register, to be sent to the regional and then national capitals for aggregation. There the votes are added to others, trickle slowly onto giant chalkboards in the capital city, and eventually find their way into the dailies.
The election-day pageantry and its immediate aftermath have a purpose. Ostensibly, this purpose is transparency, and the resultant 'free and fair election' tag. An amalgamation of international election observers in collaboration with domestic election administrators created this electoral script with its raison d'être the legitimation of the ensuing democratically-elected regime (Elklit & Svensson 1997; Schedler 2002) .
That this wrought legitimacy might somehow be perverted from its intended mission is, by itself, rather unremarkable. Scholarship focusing on African reinterpretations of the 'state' and 'market' is legion. 2 The image of a Western institution floundering in the tropical African heat only to be discovered upon closer inspection to be meticulously managed to benefit some corrupt political patron, though it might often be true to form, has become something of a cliché in the subfield of African political studies (Mbembe 2001) .
Certainly, there is some manipulation of elections going on in a handful of Africa countries by insecure leaders seeking the cachet that comes with the mantle of president without the uncertainty that accompanies actual competition. To reduce the unfortunate trend of disappearing results to simple and blatant electoral malpractice, however, would be to paint over the many nuances of the problem. There are cases, perhaps even the majority of cases, where the officially reported outcome of an election represents the will of the people. Yet here too the votes from villages and neighbourhoods are often swept out of public view. The reasons for this disappearing act are not reported, but the problem is so ubiquitous those engaging in the sleight of hand can do so comfortably within the norm.
THE PROBLEM
In a study I did on Ghanaian political parties and their social foundations I found it useful to look at detailed election results. When these results were analysed alongside available census data I got a pretty good sense of the impact of certain demographic characteristics on a district's partisan proclivities (Fridy 2007) . Hoping to apply a similar analysis to Ghana's neighbours to understand better the comparative implications of my research, I set out to compile a comprehensive data set of West African elections at the sub-national level from the late colonial period through to the present.
Cost-effective channels such as the Internet and Interlibrary Loan proved occasionally fruitful, though ultimately unsatisfying. The Internet yields the national results, the names of winners and losers, and hints at the units in which sub-national data might be recorded (Nunley 2004) . Texts obtained through Interlibrary Loan are more hit-or-miss. Given only a document's title it is quite difficult to deduce whether or not election results will be reported in an interior table. Occasionally a needle can be found in these haystacks in the form of subnational election results from a recent election, in the case of the Internet, and some bygone election, in the case of Interlibrary Loans, but invariably these results are given only at the level of a country's primary or secondary administrative division and not at the most basic polling-station level.
With a bit more investment of time, though still relatively inexpensively, one can contact researchers who were in the field during elections and are, perchance, inclined to collect results or know someone who has done so. As a general rule, unless the project is fresh and unpublished I have found scholars willing to share the information they have collected.
For several of Ghana's pre-Fourth Republic elections I was fortunate enough to stumble upon a scholar who just happened to have unpublished election results in his personal library. More often than not, however, scholars can offer only the name of a colleague at a given country's national university, archives, or electoral commission who might know where to find the data.
3 Though no doubt many of these contacts would pan out if I had several weeks in a country to pursue leads and convince officials the information would not be used for dubious purposes, without this investment telephone calls and e-mails are all too often met with one of two predictable results. If contacts can be tracked down they almost always report that the data are not at their disposal or are completely unavailable. Just as frequently, however, the only response is a disconnected telephone signal or a computer-generated bounce-back e-mail reply. 4 This leaves only the option of a country visit, which is an expensive proposition for non-residents if there are many cases under consideration, and an uncertain proposition even if they are few. Plane tickets and lodging are luxuries few scholars can dedicate to the extraction of a single piece of information, especially a single piece of information that may not even exist. Funds for such an exploration almost always come as part of a larger and more in-depth research project, where detailed election results are but icing on the cake. Unfortunately, instances such as these are few and far between for individual researchers and the scholarly community has, as yet, made no systematic effort to encourage this type of data collection as a collective endeavour.
These challenges to a researcher affiliated with a university can only be multiplied for the average citizen in these fledgling electoral regimes who has neither the material resources, the esteem in the eyes of the applicable bureaucrats, nor the knowledge of the processes and procedures of government necessary to accomplish such a task. The common man and woman is largely reliant on the goodwill of the electoral commissioners and the tenacity and skill of newspaper reporters and party functionaries to bring detailed election results to light. For one reason or another, these key ingredients have, too often, not come together. 
POTENTIAL CAUSES

Unintentional Error
Likely reasons for the disappearing data fall into two broad categories, defined by the motives of the electoral agents doing the sanitising of results. In the first category are cases where election administrators want to hide embarrassing discrepancies in their numbers but do not make a concerted effort to bias results systematically.
Though we tend to reify election results with exact counts and percentages followed by multiple decimal places, close elections and their accompanying recounts in countries around the world consistently dent this fiction. Elections, even those that are run efficiently and use state of the art tallying techniques, have a messy underbelly; voters do not always make their intent clear and counts can be imprecise and calculations inaccurate.
In 2005 I was searching for polling-station-level data for three of Ghana's constituencies for all the elections of the Fourth Republic and, if possible, those of previous republics. I wanted to use these results to compare voting patterns at the micro-level. For the 2004 elections I found the data I was looking for -not in the national headquarters in Accra but rather spread around the regional headquarters. Visits to the Ashiedu Keteke Sub-Metro Area, Ashanti Region, and Upper East Region Electoral Commission (EC) headquarters verified this fact.
Though visiting these regional headquarters required a significant outlay of time (it takes the better part of a day to reach the Upper East Region by road from Accra), once there I found the sub-national commissioners both friendly and helpful. When I asked them about data for pre-2004 elections I got a unanimous response. The results, they proclaimed, had been sent to Accra and no copies had been kept at the subnational offices.
At national headquarters I asked several people about the missing data and person after person told me it did not exist. When I asked why, I was confronted with quizzical stares and then passed along to a superior. As I worked my way higher up the commission's bureaucratic structure I finally discovered someone who knew where the data had gone. In 1996, he divulged, the aggregated numbers at polling station level did not always match the numbers at constituency level. In addition, many of the regions outside Accra did not send a complete set of pre-aggregation paperwork to the capital city. 5 The experience of 1996 resulted in the EC not even trying to collect and maintain this data in 2000. Though I could get no one to verify this sanitising procedure independently, when confronted with the story two of my informant's superiors acknowledged that his story was plausible. None denied that it had happened as he described.
Ghana's EC is one of the most, if not the most respected electoral commissions in Africa. In each of the Fourth Republic's national elections the EC has gazetted constituency-level 6 results and released these published results to the general public. The EC has been applauded by the international monitoring community and, though the political parties have been known to criticise the conduct of elections when they lose, all parties, opposition and incumbent alike, have adopted the position that the EC is an unbiased observer that should have the final word in declaring winners and losers. despite this well-earned reputation, election results in Ghana have disappeared.
In Sierra Leone, where the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has overseen fewer elections, the hiding of data was more ham-handed. Following the 2007 elections it looked at first as if the NEC was going to set new standards for transparency in the region. Its website (http://www.nec-sierraleone.org/) posted firstround results regularly from every polling station in the country as they rolled in to national headquarters. When all the counting was done scholars interested in studying the results had access to data from each of the country's 6 123 polling stations, enabling them to aggregate up to the chiefdom, district, regional, or national levels and down to the village or neighbourhood, as the research question and other variables dictated.
As no presidential candidate passed the constitutionally mandated 55 per cent threshold, a second round was set for a month later. At first it appeared that the NEC was going to continue with the tradition it had set in the first round. It released polling station-level results intermittently and, on 13 September 2007 at 3pm GMT, the vote from 76,1 per cent of the country's polling stations was publicly released.
This release was followed by days of silence. Then, on 17 September 2007 at 9.30am GMT, the NEC released the final results as a summary of the country's 14 districts, declaring Ernest Bai Koroma president, with just under 55 per cent of the vote. The public was informed that '477 stations have been invalidated due to more ballots then registered voters' but polling station-level data for the validated stations would not be made available.
Since I was working with a colleague on a paper that would benefit greatly from this undisclosed data I sent e-mails to the NEC asking it to reconsider, and contacted party agents and newspapers in search of their unofficial counts. While waiting for responses that would never come I returned to the NEC's press release and decided to compare results from the first and second rounds to see if the missing secondround data resembled what one would predict, using firstround data as an independent variable. To find out what the missing data contained I took the results from the known 76,1 per cent of polling stations and subtracted that from the total vote. When I went to gather this last bit of data I opened the NEC's PdF-formatted document and highlighted the table displaying presidential vote by district in preparation for a cut-and-paste manoeuvre.
What I found in the highlighted text were a number of invisible columns of data. My prediction was that these data would probably simply be blank columns the authors of the document used to achieve the spacing they desired. When I opened the document in Adobe Photoshop to slide a black background behind the invisible columns what I found was far less mundane. On what looked like empty space NEC officials had, at one time, stored visible columns of numbers (see Figure 1 ). I shared this formerly hidden data with a few colleagues to see if we could make sense of it.
At first we were perplexed, and the numbers remained a mystery. Then a document purportedly written by the NEC began to circulate throughout the Sierra Leonean Internet community (see Figure 2) . In a case lodged in Sierra Leone's High Court by the losing Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) against the NEC and its head, Christiana Thorpe, the document in question was identified as an NEC publication released on 'Thursday, 29th November 2007 or thereabout' to fulfil the commission's reporting duties as outlined in the country's Electoral Laws Act of 2002.
7 When the document was compared to the hidden columns in the NEC's 17 September press release it becomes obvious that, notwithstanding a few minor typographical and arithmetic discrepancies, the NEC had had all the data used to construct their 29 November document in house for more than two months.
INTENTIONAL ERROR
If unintentional errors are the unfortunate but inevitable price of universal suffrage, intentional errors are but one of the many tools in the superficial democrat's basket of tricks. Persistent citizens, especially those whose preferences lean towards opposition parties, can sometimes succeed in pressuring disingenuous polling agents actually to count the ballots sitting in the ballot boxes. While this does not necessarily remove all methods of rigging, in forcing election officials to count ballots in full sight of the community in which they were cast, there is a very real incentive for the ballot counters not to report results too far off community expectations. Give figures that are completely out of line with people's perceptions, in terms either of turnout or of preference, and the risk of vigilante justice cannot be excluded. Though it might not ultimately affect election results at the national or constituency level, at least community members will know that their votes were counted.
All too often, however, this citizen-forced democracy is impractical. In Nigeria's 2007 presidential elections, for instance, international observers noted young thugs stuffing ballots into collection boxes and threatening potential voters in queues and at their homes. Others witnessed election officials at collation centres filling out aggregation forms with no oversight and no reference to actual polling station results (Rawlence & Albin-Lackey 2007) . Though I had heard of the widespread problems with the elections, I was interested in comparing these flawed election results with the flawed results from 1999 and 2003, if for no other reason than to see whether the areas where the ruling party had sufficient power to rig results changed over the course of the three election cycles (Kew 1999; Mole 2003) .
When I e-mailed Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in search of state-level results just weeks after the 2007 elections I anticipated a failed delivery response. What I got back instead was a personal note from an INEC employee (see Figure 3) . The presidential results at state level were not ready for publication but they would be available at some date in the near future. More than two years later the results are still unavailable.
IMPLICATIONS
For the researcher the result of both intentional and unintentional error is frustration. In a world where election analysis routinely requires sophisticated exit polling and an understanding of advanced statistics and/or geographic information systems, many African specialists are being pushed to the margins of electoral studies by a lack of data.
Information which is an e-mail or simple Internet search away for scholars interested in studying elections in other parts of the world, even when some of those elections took place centuries ago, in most African countries, even in bestcase scenarios, requires significant outlays of time and money to collect. Under a far too common worst-case scenario, even after this time and money are outlaid the data being sought remain uncollected.
The solution to this dearth of data is quite simple. Electoral commissions can save and publish all their data through the government printer and, if the resources exist to maintain a website, on the World Wide Web.
8 At a minimum this data should be published at the legislative constituency level, but the expectations should be even higher. Is there a compelling reason not to make electoral data available at polling-station level? While punishment of opposition strongholds is not unheard of, in all likelihood the perpetrators of this potential harassment, namely agents of the government, have access to all the data withheld from the public. Allowing the rest of the world a peek at the detailed results would not seem to exacerbate this problem.
For reasons of embarrassment or fraud, however, electoral commissions across the continent have, by and large, chosen not to release detailed election results. This is where the international community can play an important role. While observers have a habit of condemning blatantly fraudulent elections, 'they frequently go relatively lightly on elections that, while not obviously fraudulent, nonetheless have significant flaws' (Carothers 1997, p 25) . There is a great deal of pressure on domestic and international observers to make an early and strident declaration on the validity of election results, but waiting just a few days for detailed results to be made public would be a step in the right direction.
Probably less influential than election observers, but also less burdened by highprofile political pressures, are scholars interested in subnational politics. In fraudulent elections it is doubtful that a researcher will be able to influence the government to produce detailed results and even less likely that these results will reflect accurately the will of the voting population.
In elections where the electoral commission is not actively engaged in fraud, however, changing the expectations and norms could make a considerable difference. In the tense days after an election partisans of the losing side already decry all kinds of real and/or imagined malfeasance. Releasing election results will do little to fan these flames and could, especially after electoral commissions gain a reputation for both sincerity and transparency, go a long way towards dampening allegations of wrongdoing before they reach fever pitch.
The social good that can come from even self-interested researchers pushing electoral commissions for more detailed data to test their hypotheses is potentially massive and goes well beyond the ramifications of scholarly output. Electoral commissions whose status quo position requires publishing aggregate results and hiding the constituent parts undercut the ability of citizens, especially those of low economic and social standing, to critique election results systematically. Volume 8 No 2
Villagers might have a pretty good idea that their family, friends, and neighbours supported one party heavily over another, but when these votes are thrown hurriedly into a bin with votes from hundreds or thousands of other villages and towns the costs associated with figuring out whether the will of the people has been honoured increase dramatically. This status quo gives dishonest electoral commissions ample opportunity to defraud the public and makes honest electoral commissions look disturbingly like their dishonest counterparts. 
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Source: The copy of the document depicted here was circulated on the Leonenet listserv (http://www.leonenet.net/)
